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IN PRESS WITH THE GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018) 
 
Testing International Legal Regimes: 





International shipping is on the eve of a new era where remotely controlled and partially or fully 
automated and unmanned Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) will be carrying 
international trade. The regulation of navigation and shipping in the contemporary international 
law of the sea and international maritime law are premised on human presence and control on-
board ships. Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 and 
several maritime conventions will need to be revisited to determine how MASS may be 
accommodated, and where not possible, what further legal development may be needed. 
Recently, the IMO decided to address the expected regulatory impacts of these ships and to 
prepare an agenda for their proactive regulation. This article explores regulatory impacts that 
would need to be considered and argues that MASS have the potential to provide new directions 
for international law and the IMO.  
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In recent years, research in artificial intelligence and ship technology has advanced to such an 
extent as to pave the way for partial or full autonomous commercial shipping. Technology has 
always been at the centre of shipping regulation and is frequently a major driver for new 
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standards. Recent technological and commercial triggers are leading major industry actors to 
explore different degrees of remotely-controlled ship voyages1 and autonomous ship operations 
for the near future.2 Some port operations appear to be also planning to embrace automation.3 
The absence of a crew on a vessel, per se, is not a new development, as unmanned towed barges 
and remotely operated submersibles for research and offshore petroleum development have long 
been in use. What is new is a combination of passive presence or even absence of on-board crew, 
remotely-controlled ships, and partial or full autonomous decision-making through 
instrumentation. These technologies are anticipated not only for new builds, but also for vessels 
retrofitted for remote control operations.4 The range of ships affected is diverse.5 
                                                          
1 Rolls-Royce and towage company Svitzer claim to have performed the first remotely-controlled vessel operation. 
See Anon.,World’s First Remotely-Controlled Commercial Vessel Put to the Test in Copenhagen, gCaptain, 20 June 
2017, available at: http://gcaptain.com/worlds-first-remotely-controlled-commercial-vessel-put-to-the-test-in-
copenhagen/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Gcaptain+%28gCaptain.co
m%29 (accessed on 18 September 2017). Wei Zhe Tan, NYK aims to pilot remote-controlled boxship in 2019, 
Lloyd’s List, 24 August 2017, available at: 
https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/LL111056/NYK-aims-to-pilot-remotecontrolled-
boxship-in-2019 (accessed on 14 December 2017). See also Michelle Howard, Wärtsilä Tests Remote Control 
Ship Operating Capability, Marine Link, 18 September 2017, available at: 
https://www.marinelink.com/news/capability-operating428998?utm_source=MT-ENews-2017-09-
01&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MT-ENews (accessed on 18 September 2017). 
2 The Unmanned Cargo Ship Development Alliance plans to deliver the first unmanned cargo ship in 2021. The 
Alliance is led by Chinese HNA Technology Group Co and includes CCS, China Ship Research & Development 
Institute, Shanghai Marine Diesel Engine Research Institute, Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding (Group) Co., Marine 
Design Research Institute of China (MARIC), Rolls-Royce, Wärtsilä, and the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), 
Anon., ABS Joins Alliance Developing Unmanned Cargo Ship, gCaptain, 26 July 2017, available at: 
http://gcaptain.com/abs-joins-alliance-to-develop-unmanned-cargo-ship/ (accessed on 14 December 2017). A 120 
Twenty-foot Equivalent Units autonomous open top fully-electric and zero emission container ship is under 
construction, see Kongsberg Maritime, Autonomous ship project, key facts about YARA Birkeland, available at: 
https://www.km.kongsberg.com/ks/web/nokbg0240.nsf/AllWeb/4B8113B707A50A4FC125811D00407045?OpenD
ocument (accessed on 18 September 2017). Bourbon, Automated Ships Ltd, and Kongsberg Gruppen ASA plan to 
build autonomous offshore service vessels, see Anon., Bourbon Joins Project to Build World’s First Autonomous 
Offshore Vessel, gCaptain, 11 July 2017, available at: http://gcaptain.com/bourbon-joins-project-to-build-first-
autonomous-offshore-vessel/ (accessed on 18 September 2017). 
3 Anon., VCIT world’s first fully automated container terminal: Cargotec, Canadian Shipper, 11 September 2017, 
available at: https://www.canadianshipper.com/transportation-and-logistics/vcit-worlds-first-fully-automated-
container-terminal-cargotec/1003374728/ (accessed on 18 September 2017). 
4 Alan M. Weigel/Sean T. Pribyl, The Future Is Now: Unmanned and Autonomous Surface Vessels and Their Impact 
on the Maritime Industry, Mainbrace, June 2017, 22, 23, available at: 
http://www.blankrome.com/siteFiles/Publications/Mainbrace_June_2017.pdf (accessed on 18 September 2017). 
5 In particular, the carriage of bulk cargoes is expected to be a prime candidate for autonomous ships, see David 
Stringer, Autonomous Cargo Ships Extend Miner’s Technology Drive to Seas, gCaptain, 7 June 2017, available at: 
http://gcaptain.com/autonomous-cargo-ships-extend-miners-technology-drive-
seas/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Gcaptain+%28gCaptain.com%29 
(accessed on 18 September 2017). However, automation on containerships is also anticipated. NYK is reported to be 
planning to test remote controlled steering of a boxship with a stand-by crew, Anon., NYK to Test Autonomous Box 
Ship in the Pacific Oceans in 2019, World Maritime News, 25 August 2017, available at: 




 The history of international maritime law is punctuated by game-changing technological 
milestones. This is not surprising as the ship is a platform for varied instrumentation, with the 
consequence that technological development serves to enhance ship function and operations and, 
in turn, rules and standards for safety, security, and environment protection. The advent of the 
modern cruise liner and early ship losses, most especially the Titanic, led to the adoption of the 
first convention on safety of life at sea.6 In the mid-19th century, the first rules of the road were 
introduced as a result of the introduction of the steam engine in shipping and the need to reduce 
collisions at sea. Following the Second World War, the widespread introduction of radar on 
commercial vessels led to numerous radar-assisted collisions which resulted in important 
changes in the application of the rules of the road.7 During the same period, on-board freezer 
technology enabled the transportation of refrigerated cargoes and in the process produced new 
trades.8 Within a short period thereafter, the advent of the supertanker and containerisation 
revolutionised the carriage of goods in bulk and packaged form. The increased use of tankers led 
to far-reaching vessel-source pollution regulation in both the public and private law spheres. This 
extended to construction and operational requirements9 as well as liability regimes.10 Container 
vessels transformed maritime trade and multi-modal carriage of cargo.11 More recently, with the 
receding of summer sea ice as a result of climate change and growth of shipping in polar regions, 
new rules for the construction, equipping, crewing, and operations for vessels navigating those 
waters have been adopted.12 The technology of shipping has driven much of the opus of the 
                                                          
http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/228202/nyk-to-test-autonomous-boxship-in-2019/ (accessed on 18 
September 2017). 
6 Eventually leading to the current iteration, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 November 
1974, UNTS 1184, 2 (SOLAS Convention). 
7 In particular the rules on look out and safe speed. Arts. 5-6 Convention on the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea, 20 October 1972, UNTS 1050, 16 (COLREGS). 
8 See Stanley H. Beaver, Ships and Shipping: The Geographical Consequences of Technological Progress, 
Geography 52 (1967), 133. 
9 Primarily under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 November 1973, UNTS 
1340, 184, as amended by the Protocol Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships of 1973, 17 February 1978, UNTS 1340, 61 (MARPOL). Annex 1 includes standards and rules for 
construction and discharge of oily wastes from tank washing at sea. 
10 In particular the following: International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 
1969, UNTS 973, 3 (CLC Convention); International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 18 December 1971, UNTS 1110, 57 (IOPCF Convention). 
11 See Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy 
Bigger (2006). 
12 International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), Requirements Concerning Polar Class (2011), 
available at: http://www.iacs.org.uk/document/public/Publications/Unified_requirements/PDF/UR_I_pdf410.pdf 
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International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialised agency of the United Nations and the 
competent organisation with respect to international shipping.13 Maritime autonomous surface 
ships (MASS) have the potential of triggering new regulatory responses and the IMO is yet again 
expected to lead that exercise. 
 
Across the field of maritime regulation, a source of constant concern is the human factor 
in vessel operations. Autonomous shipping has the potential to substantially reduce or even 
remove the human factor in the operation and navigation of the ship, relegating it to a passive or 
temporary on-board presence and even to fully shore-based monitoring and controlling role. The 
role of automation ranges from support to human decision-making to autonomous decision-
making. In setting standards and rules for shipping, maritime regulation has frequently been 
concerned with the influence of human decision-making and conduct, by employing technologies 
and processes to produce safety, environmental, and security outcomes. Autonomous shipping 
has the potential to transfer human assessment and decision-making to artificial intelligence. 
This entails the use of “algorithms, tools and techniques that mimic human learning to solve 
specific problems” and “to recognize patterns in data, making predictions from previously 
unseen data.”14 These systems will be able to generate and compute more data and significantly 
enhance situational awareness, but will they be a replacement for human judgement? 
  
                                                          
(accessed on 18 September 2017). The IACS polar class requirements are implicitly adopted in the Polar Code, Part 
I-A para. 1.2.10. The Code and related amendments to international conventions were adopted in stages: Maritime 
Safety Committee (MSC), International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), MSC Resolution 
385(94) of 21 November 2014, Report on its 94th Session, IMO Doc. 94/21/Add.1 (27 November 2014), Annex 6; 
id., Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974, as amended, in ibid., Annex 
7. For a consolidated online edition of the Polar Code, see International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, 
available at: 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Documents/POLAR%20CODE%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOP
TED.pdf (accessed on 18 September 2017). 
13 The UNCLOS designates the IMO as the competent international organization with respect to international 
shipping in numerous provisions. These are listed in ‘Competent or Relevant International Organizations’ under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea Bulletin 31 (1996), 79 at 81 et seq. 
14 “Machine Learning is a set of algorithms, tools, and techniques that mimic human learning to solve specific 
problems. By analyzing existing data sets, machine learning can be used to recognize patterns in data, making 
predictions from previously unseen data. The bigger the data set, the more complex the patterns the model can 
recognize and the more accurate the predictions.”, Anon., Rolls-Royce to Use Google Machine Learning in Quest 
for Autonomous Ships, gCaptain, 3 October 2017, available at: http://gcaptain.com/rolls-royce-to-use-google-
machine-learning-in-quest-for-autonomous-ships/ (accessed on 3 October 2017). 
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There are good reasons to believe that unmanned and autonomous ships will not be 
technologies of passing interest. There is a discernible declining interest in seafaring careers with 
consequent trend towards shortage of seafarers. As ships have grown bigger, crews have become 
smaller, working long hours and frequently performing tedious tasks, and having little if any 
time for port visits because of fast cargo turnaround and security reasons. Crewing costs are one 
of the most significant elements in a ship’s cost structure.15 Without a crew (at least permanent) 
and in the absence of need of full crew quarters and design to enable safe movement on board, 
the autonomous ship will be lighter and cheaper to build. Most passageways for crews will be 
removed. Crew quarters will be minimised and perhaps even removed. When needed, crew space 
may be containerised and installed temporarily into the ship. The bridge as conceived in 
contemporary ships will be smaller and simpler. In addition to saving on crew salaries, there will 
be savings on crew supplies and energy. The ship will have a slick design and will be equipped 
with a complex array of sensors and instrumentation. Its design and absence of crew will make it 
difficult for pirates to board. It will likely be navigated more accurately and consequently with 
fewer errors, if any, than crewed vessels. It will consume less energy and produce fewer 
greenhouse gas emissions. However, the deployment of autonomous ships could produce new 
concerns, in particular with respect to the interaction with crewed ships in their vicinity and 
cyber security.16 
 
 The IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) has heeded a recent call to launch a 
regulatory scoping exercise with respect to ‘maritime autonomous surface ships’ (MASS), the 
term used in this article to capture the emerging technologies of unmanned and autonomous 
ships.17 A multi-Member State submission highlighted the undesirability of leaving the 
regulation of autonomous ships to the national level in the absence of an appropriate 
                                                          
15 In 2015, crew costs were the third highest cost at 17% after ship finance and competition costs, each at 22%. See 
Anon., Ship Operating Costs Set to Rise, Maritime Executive, 30 October 2015, available at: http://maritime-
executive.com/article/ship-operating-costs-set-to-rise (accessed on 18 September 2017). 
16 The concern is that autonomous ships may become targets for hackers. In the recent hacking of MAERSK, the 
company is reported to have lost $200-300 million. Danish insurer Tryg predicts that 90% of its clients will buy 
cyber insurance, Stine Jacobsen, Rising Hacker Threat Will Trigger Boom in Cyber Crime Insurance, Tryg Says, 
Reuters, 4 October 2017, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tryg-cyber/rising-hacker-threat-will-
trigger-boom-in-cyber-crime-insurance-tryg-says-idUSKCN1C91MV (accessed on 4 October 2017). 
17 MSC, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its 98th Session, IMO Doc. MSC 98/23 (28 June 2017), 79. 
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international framework.18 After all, as ‘the competent international organisation’ with respect to 
international shipping matters, it is the responsibility of the IMO to develop and maintain the 
international standards and rules necessary for safe navigation. The IMO has been requested to 
identify regulations which preclude unmanned operations, regulations that do not apply to 
unmanned operations because of the absence of a crew, and regulations which do not preclude 
unmanned operations but which may need to be amended to take into consideration the operation 
of MASS.19 
 
Against this backdrop, it is appropriate to enquire whether the advent of MASS requires 
mere incremental or adaptive regulation, or rather constitutes a game-changer requiring 
substantial new regulatory directions, and further what might be consequences for the 
international law of the sea with respect to provisions concerning navigation. This inquiry 
explores what could or should be expected regulatory impacts when the human factor is reduced 
or eliminated from decision-making with respect to ship operations where traditionally human 
presence and control are presumed, required, and regulated with attendant legal consequences. 
There is an emerging body of scholarship on the public and private law aspects of the subject and 
it raises important questions with respect to the potential impacts in both fields.20 The focus of 
this article is on public law aspects. This author argues that MASS have the potential to provide 
new directions for international law and the IMO. As the MSC embarks on its scoping exercise 
during the expected four sessions, this article explores the extent to which MASS are or can be 
accommodated in contemporary regulation and explores areas of potential direct and indirect 
                                                          
18 Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships Proposal for a Regulatory Scoping Exercise, Submitted by Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, IMO Doc. MSC 98/20/2 (27 February 2017) (MASS Scoping Exercise). See also Impact of New and 
Advancing Technologies to Maritime Transport and the Regulatory Framework, Submitted by Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden and IMarEST, IMO Doc. MSC 98/22/7 (28 March 2017). 
19 Ibid. 
20 For example: Eric Van Hooydonk, The Law of Unmanned Merchant Shipping: An Exploration, Journal of 
International Maritime Law 20 (2014), 403; Paul W. Pritchett, Ghost Ships: Why the Law Should Embrace 
Unmanned Vessel Technology, Tulane Maritime Law Journal 40 (2015-2016), 197; Hannah Stones, Objective and 
Subjective Safety in Unmanned Shipping, Shipping and Trade Law (STL) 16 (9) (2016), 4; Trudi Hogg/Samrat 
Ghosh, Autonomous Merchant Vessels: Examination of Factors that Impact the Effective Implementation of 
Unmanned Ships, Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 8 (2016), 206; Michal Chwedczuk, Analysis of 
the Legal Status of Unmanned Commercial Vessels in U.S. Admiralty and Maritime Law, International Journal of 
Machine Learning and Cybernetics 47 (2016), 123; Robert Veal/Michael Tsimplis, The Integration of Unmanned 
Ships into the Lex Maritima, Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly (2017), 303; Robert Veal, 
Unmanned Ships on the IMO Work Agenda, STL 17 (5) (2017), 1. 
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impacts. The article concludes with reflections on how well-positioned maritime regulation is, or 
is not, with respect to the withdrawal of the human factor from shipping in favour of automated 
systems and the possible implications for further legal development. 
 
II. Technology and Terminology 
 
While the term used in this article is MASS, the terminology of autonomous ships is not yet 
settled. The term ‘MASS’ appears in the initial discourse at the IMO, whereas industry circles 
and scholarly literature have used other diverse terms, including ‘unmanned surface vessels’, 
‘autonomous unmanned merchant vessels,’ ‘robot ships’, ‘crewless ships’, ‘unmanned ships’, 
and ‘automated ships’, among others. In considering how MASS will impact contemporary 
maritime regulation, an early task for the IMO will be terminological clarity and consistency. 
Terminology has already triggered varying views, with some Member States preferring to define 
the term to clarify the scope of the Organization’s future work, whereas others preferred to leave 
definitional matters to a later stage.21 
 
Automation in shipping is not a complete novelty. Various aspects of a ship’s operations 
have been subject to automation for some time, such as automatic course-setting and certain 
machinery functions in the engine room. MASS will navigate partially or fully without a master 
and crew on board and with its control emanating from an automated system or through remote 
means. The ship will be equipped with instrumentation and software programmes that will 
ensure its accurate location, using global positioning (GPS) and automatic identification system 
(AIS) transmission, and perform various functions. It will have situation awareness through 
sensors and cameras that will serve as its eyes and ears, sensing the presence of other vessels, as 
well as the usual radar so as to navigate in compliance with the rules of the road.22 The vessel 
will be generating and receiving digital data via satellite communication. Algorithms will be at 
heart of computerised autonomous decision-making for safe navigation. This technology may be 
                                                          
21 MSC (note 17), 79. 
22 Thomas Porathe/Johannes Prison/Yemao Man, Situation Awareness in Remote Control Centres for Unmanned 
Ships, paper presented at Human Factors in Ship Design & Operation, London, 26-27 February 2014, available at: 
http://publications.lib.chalmers.se/records/fulltext/194797/local_194797.pdf (accessed on 18 September 2017). 
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employed to assist the crew on board or even to replace them, whether temporarily or for much 
of, if not the whole voyage. 
 
The term ‘unmanned’ does not necessarily entail the total absence of human intervention 
in the navigation and operation of the vessel at sea. A concept advanced by a major research 
project considers how the technology may be introduced with respect to bulk cargo carriage and 
with safety outcomes at least comparable to manned ships.23 As bulkers have long voyages 
usually without multiple port cargo drops, they would need a temporary crew and pilot only 
during the port approach, berthing, and de-berthing. The long unmanned voyage would be 
monitored remotely from a shore based control centre. Thus the ship may operate autonomously 
for periods of time, but humans will be on standby for ready intervention if or when needed, or 
the vessel may be remotely controlled and operated when needed. 
 
Differently from the autonomous vessel, the remotely controlled vessel is directed from a 
shore base. Thus, the traditional fully manned vessel and the concept of the fully autonomous 
ship are two ends of a spectrum along which there is a range of vessels with differing degrees of 
manning, remote control, and automation. A Danish study from an engineering perspective 
describes the degrees of ship automation beyond manual navigation to include, in order of 
increasing intensity, automatic course steering (on autopilot on the basis of a human encoded 
course), decision-support (the system provides information for a human decision), remotely 
operated navigation (off-board instructions for autopilot and machinery), remote monitoring (full 
off-board situational ship awareness – radar, digital, TV-monitoring – to enable remote 
controlled navigation), partial autonomy (on-board partial decision-making autonomy to inform 
on-board/off-board officer of navigation decisions), and full autonomy (full situation awareness, 
assessment, and decision-making without human intervention).24 
 
                                                          
23 Hans-Christoph Burmeister/Wilko Bruhn/Ørnulf Jan Rødseth/Thomas Porathe, Autonomous Unmanned 
Merchant Vessel and its Contribution towards the e-Navigation Implementation: The MUNIN Perspective, 
International Journal of e-Navigation and Maritime Economy 1 (2014), 1. 
24 Mogens Blanke/Michael Henriques/Jakob Bang, A Pre-Analysis on Autonomous Ships (2016), 3, available at: 
https://www.dma.dk/Documents/Publikationer/Autonome%20skibe_DTU_rapport_UK.pdf (accessed on 18 
September 2017). 
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 The early legal discourse on MASS raised the question whether the autonomous vessel is 
in fact a ‘ship’ as generally understood in international maritime law in order to ascertain its 
legal status and application of the various public and private maritime law conventions.25 While 
‘ship’ and ‘vessel’ are used interchangeably in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS),26 they are not defined in that instrument. Rather, the search for definitions leads 
to the international maritime conventions, several of which are considered below, but without 
attempting an exhaustive listing. In most cases the term ‘ship’ is defined and the definition 
includes ‘vessel(s)’ having specific characteristics and/or performing particular functions for the 
purpose of delimiting the scope and application of the instrument concerned. A perusal of several 
of these instruments illustrates the drafting practice. In the marine pollution conventions, ‘ship’ 
is defined as or includes: “any sea-going vessel of any type whatsoever”;27 “a vessel of any type 
whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion 
vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms”;28 “any sea-going vessel 
and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk 
as cargo […]”;29 “a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and 
includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, and floating craft of any type”;30 “a 
vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, 
air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft, fixed or floating platforms, floating storage 
units (FSUs) and floating production storage and off-loading units (FPSOs)”;31 and “a vessel of 
any type whatsoever operating in the aquatic environment and includes submersibles, floating 
                                                          
25 For example see Comité Maritime International (CMI), CMI International Working Group Position Paper on 
Unmanned Ships and the International Regulatory Framework, 2017, 3, available at: 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Questionnaires/CMI%20Position%20Paper%20on%20Unmanned%20Ship
s.pdf (accessed on 18 September 2017). 
26 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, UNTS 1833, 396 (UNCLOS). 
27 Art. II (2) International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 
29 November 1969, UNTS 970, 211; Art. 1 (1) International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage, 23 March 2001, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.12/19 (27 March 2001); Art. 1 (1) International Convention on 
Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by 
Sea, 2 May 1996, ILM 35, 1406. 
28 Art. 2 (4) MARPOL. 
29 Art. I (1) CLC Convention. An identical definition is included in Art. I (1) IOPCF Convention. 
30 Art. 2 (3) International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 30 November 
1990, UNTS 1891, 51. 
31 Art. 2 (9) International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, 5 October 2001, 
IMO Doc. AFS/CONF/26 Annex (18 October 2001) (AFS Convention). 
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craft, floating platforms, FSUs and FPSOs”.32 In a maritime security convention, ‘ship’ is 
defined as “a vessel of any type whatsoever not permanently attached to the sea-bed, including 
dynamically supported craft, submersibles, or any floating craft.”33 The definitions of ‘ship’ for 
maritime carriage purposes include: “vessel used for the carriage of goods by sea”;34 “only a sea-
going vessel, excluding air-cushion vehicle”;35 “any self-propelled sea-going vessel used in 
international seaborne trade for the transport of goods, passengers, or both with the exception of 
less than 500 gross registered tons”.36 They share the common themes of ‘sea-going’ and/or 
performing marine transportation. It is unusual for ‘ship’ and ‘vessel’ to be inverted, as in the 
case of a salvage convention where “vessel means any ship or craft or any structure capable of 
navigation”37 and collision avoidance rules where ‘vessel’ is defined to include “every 
description of water craft, including non-displacement craft and seaplanes, used or capable of 
being used as a means of transport on water.”38 However, for the purpose of the discussion of 
autonomous ships the difference is immaterial and none of the definitions provided above pose a 
problem for the consideration of autonomous vessels as ‘ships’. 
 
Accordingly, the ship will be subject to domestic and international safety, environmental 
and security regulations. The rules and standards will govern its entire life from construction, 
through operations, and eventual recycling. Its operational life will include rules with respect to 
its seaworthiness and crewing. The private law consequences include the generation of liens 
unique to ships, the ability of a creditor to arrest and proceed in rem against the ship, and the 
ability of the owner, among other related interests in the ship, to enjoy certain defences, most 
especially limitation of liability. The ship is a piece of property that enjoys a status unique to 
maritime law. The early conceptions and prototypes of MASS clearly foresee vessels that 
perform the full range of functions of ships that are fully manned. The distinctive characteristics 
                                                          
32 Art. 1 (12) International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 13 
February 2004, IMO Doc. BWM/CONF/36 (16 February 2004) (BWM Convention). 
33 Art. 1 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10 March 
1988, UNTS 1678, 201. 
34 Art. 2 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of Liability of 
Owners of Seagoing Vessels, 25 August 1924, LNTS 120, 123. 
35 Art. 1 (3) Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 13 December 
1974, UNTS 1463, 20. 
36 Art. 2 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 7 February 1986, ILM 26, 1229. 
37 Art. 1 (b) International Convention on Salvage, 28 April 1989, UNTS 1953, 165. 
38 Rule 3 (a) COLREGS. 
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are the absence of a crew and in the case of a fully autonomous vessel, the relegation of decision-
making to an automated system. While factoring the withdrawal of the human element, there is 
not much reason not to consider MASS as capable to produce most of the legal consequences 
usually associated with ships. Rather than with definitional concerns, the focus should be on the 
impact of the absence of or lessened human element on particular institutions that are premised 
on human appraisal, judgement, and decision-making. 
 
III. Implications for the International Law of the Sea 
 
MASS are likely to raise some questions of interpretation and application of the conventional 
and customary law of the sea, in particular the UNCLOS of 1982. The key question posed is the 
extent to which the pertinent UNCLOS regimes are sufficiently broad so as to seamlessly support 
the advent of MASS, or whether the characteristics of these new technologies require revisiting 
of the assumptions and expected applications of particular rules. Of special interest are regimes 
where MASS enjoy navigational rights as all other ships and jurisdictional powers with respect 
to international shipping based on the assumption that ships are manned, more specifically with 
respect to flag, coastal, and port States. At first blush, the frequent reference to the generic terms 
‘vessel’ or ‘ship’ in the UNCLOS suggests that the provisions concerned apply to all ships 
including MASS. However, a probing analysis of some provisions raises potential issues.39 
 
A. Flag State 
 
The flag State has a right to register any class of ship and by doing so will be extending the 
application of its laws and protections to the ship wherever it navigates.40 The question as to 
whether a national register of shipping is able to accommodate MASS is not an issue in the 
UNCLOS and indeed for many flag States that do not require manning as a condition for the 
registration of a ship. Registration requirements usually include ship name, IMO number, 
ownership, technical particulars, whether the vessel is on a bareboat charter, whether the vessel’s 
previous registration is terminated, and also mortgages or hypothecs on the ship and their status. 
                                                          
39 MSC (note 17), 79. 
40 Arts. 91-92 UNCLOS. 
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If registration of MASS ships is an issue for some States, it is likely because of domestic 
requirements. Once a vessel is entered into the register of ships, the flag State commences to 
enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over those vessels when they are on the high seas,41 concurrent 
jurisdiction with coastal States during the exercise of innocent passage,42 transit passage,43 
archipelagic sea lanes, and innocent passage in archipelagic waters,44 and concurrent jurisdiction 
with port States when ships are voluntarily in a foreign port.45 The flag State has a right to 
provide them with consular assistance in foreign ports.46 
 
The right to establish a ship register is accompanied by the duty to effectively exercise 
jurisdiction and control over MASS entered into the register.47 The actions usually associated 
with this power would need to be reconsidered in the case of unmanned ships. If the ship does 
not carry a crew the exercise of jurisdiction and control will be expected to focus on 
administrative and technical, rather than the maritime labour aspects (master, officers, and crew) 
as would be the case with crewed ships.48 As the technology of MASS develops, it is conceivable 
that new rules (international and domestic) governing the desired competencies and capabilities 
of the shore-board personnel responsible as well as the instrumentation for the remote or 
automated navigation of the ship, including communications, will be needed.49 
 
More of an issue in the UNCLOS is the duty of the flag State to  
 
take such measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with 
regard, inter alia, to: (a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships; (b) the 
manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews, taking into account the 
                                                          
41 Art. 92 (1) UNCLOS. 
42 Art. 21 UNCLOS. 
43 Arts. 42 and 45 UNCLOS. 
44 Arts. 49, 52-54 UNCLOS. 
45 Art. 8 (1) UNCLOS. 
46 Arts. 27 and 231 UNCLOS. 
47 Art. 94 (1) UNCLOS. 
48 Art. 94 (1) and (2) UNCLOS. 
49 CMI (note 25), 16. This paper observes that unmanned ships will introduce a new range of personnel  and 
qualification standards. 
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applicable international instruments; (c) the use of signals, the maintenance of 
communications and the prevention of collisions.50  
 
The contemplated measures include requirements concerning technology of the 
traditional ship used by an on-board crew, rather than MASS. For example, the measures are 
expected to include on-board “charts, nautical publications and navigational equipment and 
instruments as are appropriate for the safe navigation of the ship.”51 While a fully autonomous 
ship will have navigation equipment, it may not have charts on board, but rather will be able to 
download chart and navigational data as pre-programmed and as needed. Admittedly, electronic 
charts, digital manuals useable online, and electronic notices to shipping are now already in 
widespread use. 
 
A more difficult requirement for the flag State is to ensure  
 
that each ship is in the charge of a master and officers who possess appropriate 
qualifications, in particular in seamanship, navigation, communications and marine 
engineering, and that the crew is appropriate in qualification and numbers for the type, 
size, machinery and equipment of the ship.52  
 
Simply stated, the rule requires the ship to have qualified personnel on-board. One could argue 
that the crew requirement in this rule is relative to the type of ship and machinery, and if the ship 
is partially or fully automated, then it follows that a crew is not needed all of the time, if at all, 
without violating the rule. Thus, the practise of using towed, but unmanned barges for carriage of 
goods is of long standing. Further, if the fundamental purpose of the manning requirement is to 
ensure that there is competent operation and navigation of the vessel, it could be argued that a 
MASS vessel could be competently operated and navigated in a remote or autonomous manner 
where it can be demonstrated that safety, environmental protection, and security are assured at 
least to the same extent as with a manned vessel. For remotely operated vessels, “in the charge 
of” could be constructively interpreted to include the shore-based team of professionals in charge 
                                                          
50 Art. 94 (3) UNCLOS. 
51 Art. 94 (4)(a) UNCLOS. 
52 Art. 94 (4)(b) UNCLOS. 
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of the vessel’s navigation, but presumably the standard of human competence still applies to the 
shore-based team. Arguing that the element of human control is nonetheless manifested in the 
writer who creates the algorithm appears to stretch too far because the autonomous ship is 
expected to operate with ongoing human control. 
 
A similar interpretation issue arises with respect to remotely controlled and autonomous 
warships. The definition of ‘warships’, while specifically requiring that they are under the armed 
forces of a State, further specifies that they are “under the command of an officer duly 
commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service 
list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.”53 
However, warships are excepted from the mandatory application of the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974 (SOLAS Convention)54 and the International Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers of 1978 (STCW 
Convention).55 
 
The rule  
 
that the master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew are fully conversant with 
and required to observe the applicable international regulations concerning the safety of 
life at sea, the prevention of collisions, the prevention, reduction and control of marine 
pollution, and the maintenance of communications by radio56 
 
is a challenge for ships in autonomous mode and will be considered further below. For 
remotely controlled ships, and as discussed in the previous paragraph, the shore-based team 
could be argued to provide the human constructive presence and expertise underlying this 
requirement. However, for autonomous ships it is difficult to argue that the algorithm substitutes 
                                                          
53 Art. 29 UNCLOS. 
54 Ch. 1, Reg. 3 (a) SOLAS Convention. 
55 Art. 3 (a) International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 7 July 
1978, UNTS 1361, 2 (STCW Convention). The exception applies to “(a) warships, naval auxiliaries or other ships 
owned or operated by a State and engaged only on governmental non-commercial service; however, each Party shall 
ensure by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing the operations or operational capabilities of such ships 
owned or operated by it, that the persons serving on board such ships meet the requirements of the Convention so far 
as is reasonable and practicable”. 
56 Art. 94 (4)(c) UNCLOS. 
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the requirement for fully-conversant master, officers, and crew in this provision. As for the 
communications aspect, which entails an ability for other vessels and public authorities to 
communicate with the vessel, the shore-based personnel behind a remotely controlled ship could 
conceivably perform this function. This constructive interpretation of the UNCLOS provisions 
does not easily extend to vessels in autonomous mode because decision-making is left to 
algorithms, rather than to direct human decision-making, and two-way communication involving 
a machine on the autonomous vessel and humans on vessels in its vicinity (for instance using 
very high frequency radio (VHF) to avoid close quarters) may not be possible, let alone 
desirable. 
 
In performing these duties, the flag State “is required to conform to generally accepted 
international regulations, procedures and practices and to take any steps which may be necessary 
to secure their observance.”57 This provision invokes international regulations that may only be 
adopted by the IMO and at this time the pertinent maritime conventions do not directly address 
the particular requirements and perhaps exemptions (for example from manning requirements) 
that will be needed for MASS ships. 
 
Flag States are required to ensure compliance of their ships with international rules and 
standards and provide for effective enforcement.58 This duty extends to preventing their ships 
from operating unless they comply with requirements for design, construction, and manning,59 
and to require them to carry on board certificates which may be required under various 
conventions, 60 such as SOLAS61 and the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships of 1973/78 (MARPOL).62 While some documentation is already available 
in digital format and there is a trend towards passive interactive ship-shore reporting, the 
operationalisation of the rule concerning documentation on board MASS will need to be 
reconsidered when an inspecting coastal or port State authority official requests the certificates, 
as will be seen below with respect to port State control. 
                                                          
57 Art. 94 (5) UNCLOS. 
58 Art. 217 (1) UNCLOS. 
59 Art. 217 (2) UNCLOS. 
60 Art. 217 (3) UNCLOS. 
61 For example Ch. I, Reg. 16 SOLAS Convention on availability of certificates on board the ship. 
62 For example Annex I, Reg. 10 MARPOL with respect to the International Oil Pollution Certificate. 




 Another constraint with respect to MASS is the flag State’s responsibility under the 
UNCLOS to require the master of a ship to offer assistance to persons in distress at sea,63 also a 
duty under SOLAS.64 This duty includes assistance to persons, deviating from the established 
course to proceed with speed to the rescue of persons in distress, and rendering assistance to the 
other ship involved in a collision. It is difficult to see how an unmanned ship can discharge this 
humanitarian duty, other than, perhaps, for the shore-based team to notify rescue services in the 
area of the incident and leave the MASS vessel in the area just in case search and rescue 
response services need to use the vessel as a platform, if appropriate. 
 
 In summary, the rules concerning duties of the flag State in the UNCLOS reflect a 
combination of the need for constructive interpretation of some provisions and addressing 
regulatory gaps with respect to ships that are unmanned. They potentially pose a problem for the 
flag State in the exercise of effective jurisdiction and control if the duty to ensure the manning of 
ships is interpreted literally as a requirement to have crew members on board of the MASS. 
However, if the deployment of a temporary crew for port approach navigation, berthing, and de-
berthing, and a shore-based team for the long stretches of navigation of the vessel are interpreted 
constructively to be the equivalent of the actual manning in the case of remotely controlled ships, 
the gap is effectively removed. The same cannot be said for fully autonomous ships if these 
indeed become a reality, thus leaving a gap that would need to be addressed through other 
means. 
 
B. Coastal State 
 
The coastal State’s limited jurisdiction over ships exercising the rights of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea, sea lanes passage through archipelagic waters, and transit passage 
through straits used for international navigation extends to all ships, but not to warships.65 The 
coastal State may adopt laws and regulations to govern innocent passage in the territorial sea 
                                                          
63 Art. 98 UNCLOS. 
64 Ch. V, Reg. 33 SOLAS Convention. 
65 Art. 32 UNCLOS. 
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(and archipelagic waters)66 with respect to safety of navigation,67 and in doing so must not apply 
“design, construction, manning or equipment [standards] unless they are giving effect to 
generally accepted international rules or standards.”68 At this time, neither the UNCLOS (supra) 
nor SOLAS (infra) exempts ships from actual manning requirements. In theory, a coastal State 
could regulate a manning requirement for MASS in transit, especially in areas of heavy traffic, 
because in doing so it would not be applying a standard other than a generally accepted 
international manning standard. An analogous argument could be made with respect to laws and 
regulations for pollution prevention.69 With respect to transit passage, the coastal State has less 
flexibility in finding issues with MASS because its laws and regulations must “not discriminate 
in form or in fact among foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect of denying, 
hampering or impairing the rights of passage […]”70 The UNCLOS text in this part does not 
provide the coastal State with a justification to impose a manning requirement. 
 
 There are potential difficulties that coastal States could face in undertaking enforcement 
action in accordance with UNCLOS. In undertaking enforcement action against MASS that 
violate pollution prevention laws applicable in the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) when they are voluntarily in its port, the coastal State has to contend with a scenario 
where it is unclear whether there is a human person behind the violation and, if there is, how to 
exercise jurisdiction over a human person (or corporation) who may not be within its territorial 
jurisdiction, despite the vessel’s voluntary presence.71 The coastal State has the power to 
undertake physical inspection of MASS, and where the evidence so warrants, it may detain such 
vessels although there are no persons on board.72 It could be difficult for the coastal State to pin 
responsibility to a specific person. A commonly applied practical approach to pollution offences 
is strict liability, so that the actus reus alone will be sufficient to proceed against the ship. 
Another challenge is how a coastal State authority is to communicate with MASS when 
unmanned. When it has clear grounds to believe that there is a pollution incident, the coastal 
                                                          
66 Art. 52 (1) UNCLOS. 
67 Art. 21 (1)(a) UNCLOS. 
68 Art. 21 (2) UNCLOS. 
69 Art.211 (6) UNCLOS. 
70 Art. 42 (2) UNCLOS. 
71 Art. 220 (1) UNCLOS. 
72 Art. 220 (2) and (6) UNCLOS. 
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State may require such a vessel to provide “information on its identity and port of registry, its 
last and its next port of call and other relevant information required to establish whether a 
violation has occurred.”73 While communication with a remotely operated vessel should not be 
an issue because there will be contact with a shore-based crew, two-way communication with a 
vessel in autonomous mode could be difficult when inspectors need to conduct a lengthy 
exchange unless a shore-based team intervenes. The power of a coastal State to conduct a 
physical inspection could be constrained.74 The first stage of physical inspection is limited to an 
examination of on-board certificates, records, or other documents,75 which as seen earlier may 
simply be digital. A second and more probing inspection stage may be undertaken if there are 
issues with such documents, and where it is established that a violation has occurred, the vessel 
has a right to release after reasonable procedures are completed, such as posting of a bond or 
other appropriate financial security, just like any other ship.76 The coastal State may refuse 
release only exceptionally or release conditionally, notifying the flag State in such eventualities, 
who in turn may still seek prompt release.77 
 
A potentially more complex issue for a coastal State is a scenario where MASS are in 
need of assistance and request refuge in a port or safe waters of that State. The custom of 
providing refuge to ships in distress has been narrowed down in State practice to humanitarian 
assistance.78 An unmanned ship does not need humanitarian assistance, but its cargo could be 
very valuable and the vessel’s  distressed condition could be such as to threaten the marine 
environment. Although the coastal State has rights of self-protection under conventional law, it 
will be guided by the IMO Guidelines for Ships in Need of Assistance.79 While the guidelines 
are clearly voluntary, they are increasingly considered as good practice for risk-based decision-
making. However, the problem with the guidelines is that they assume that the vessel in need of 
assistance has a master and crew on board, and that usually the vessel will be receiving salvage 
                                                          
73 Art. 220 (3) UNCLOS. 
74 Art. 220 (5) UNCLOS. 
75 Art. 226 (1)(a) UNCLOS. 
76 Art. 226 (1)(b) UNCLOS. 
77 Arts. 226 (1)(c) and 292 UNCLOS. 
78 ACT Shipping (OTE) Ltd. v. Minister for the Marine, Ireland and the Attorney-General (The MV Toledo) [1995] 2 
ILRM 30. 
79 Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance, IMO Assembly Resolution A.949(23) of 5 
December 2003, IMO Doc. A 23/Res.949 (5 March 2004). 
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assistance as well. The guidelines establish a communications process between the three parties 
to enable coastal State decision-makers to decide on refuge. Usually, the master and crew will be 
the persons who have first and most in-depth knowledge of the condition of the ship. The 
absence of such persons on board the vessel could constrain the decision-making process on 
refuge. 
 
C. Port State 
 
The port State’s concern with MASS is with respect to the enforcement of international rules and 
standards and responding to the requests of other States concerning the autonomous vessel 
‘voluntarily’ in its port.80 The notice of arrival, which can be verbal or electronic, constitutes an 
indication of the intention to enter port. When a vessel is selected for inspection, there is usually 
communication between the port State control inspector and the ship master. Presumably, such 
communication may be undertaken with the shore-based team, but the inspector will need to 
board the ship. Usually, the inspector will board and personally communicate with the master or 
officer on watch (OOW). If the autonomous vessel does not have personnel on board in the 
foreign port, it is conceivable that the ship’s agent, usually appointed to act on behalf of its 
interests in a foreign port, may need to step in. However, the ship agent is usually a commercial, 
rather than a person with technical knowledge of the ship as a crew member. Thus the 
inspector’s questions may need to be directed to persons who are not present on the ship during 
the inspection, or simply wait until such persons are available.  
 
 When an autonomous vessel is port-inspected and found to have discharged wastes in 
violation of international standards, there is the further enforcement constraint with respect to 
who to proceed against when the ‘person’ responsible for the discharge is outside of the 
territorial jurisdiction of the port State. The UNCLOS does not indicate what persons would be 
pursued in the institution of proceedings and the vessel is personified in the sense that it is 
expected to comply with the inspection.81 The port State has the power to detain the vessel to 
                                                          
80 Art. 218 UNCLOS. 
81 Art. 218 (3) UNCLOS. 
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persuade the person(s) concerned to submit to jurisdiction. The port State would need to inform 
the flag State. 
 
IV. Implications for International Maritime Law 
 
The article now considers the potential impact of MASS on the international maritime legal 
system. Consisting of conventions and other legal instruments of the IMO, international maritime 
regulation addresses all ships and is largely premised on a human presence on board and in 
control of the navigation of the ship, as well as performing contingent functions such as 
provision of notices, log book entries, reporting, and responding to distress calls for assistance. 
The provision of certain services to ships is also premised on human interaction, such as in the 
case of pilotage where the master and OOW cooperate with the pilot in formulating the passage 
plan and taking and executing navigation instructions. The human element is underscored by 
trained crews. For the purposes of the present discussion, a selection of salient instruments and 
provisions are discussed to exemplify the potential impacts of MASS on contemporary maritime 
regulation, while acknowledging that a comprehensive analysis of all IMO regulations will be 
needed to ascertain the full regulatory impact of MASS. 
 
A. Maritime Safety 
 
The SOLAS Convention constitutes the backbone of international maritime safety regulation. 
Through fourteen chapters and numerous codes, it sets out standards, inter alia, for ship 
construction, machinery, cargo handling, stability, life-saving equipment and procedures, 
radiocommunications, safe carriage of cargoes and oil fuels, carriage of dangerous goods, 
additional standards for specific types of vessels (e.g., nuclear ships, bulk carriers, high speed 
craft), safe navigation, management for safe ship operations, maritime security, and polar 
shipping. In principle, and whatever function they perform, MASS will be captured by a range of 
SOLAS rules and standards. SOLAS establishes a comprehensive system for the inspection, 
surveying, and certification requirements for ships to ensure compliance with international 
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standards.82 The principal issues that MASS raise are with respect to safety aspects where the 
human factor is concerned. 
 
As observed in the earlier discussion with respect to the flag State’s duties under the 
UNCLOS, a key SOLAS rule provides that “Contracting Governments undertake, each for its 
national ships, to maintain, or, if it is necessary, to adopt measures for the purposes of ensuring 
that, from the point of view of safety of life at sea, all ships shall be sufficiently and efficiently 
manned”.83 The intention of this rule is to ensure that all ships are sufficiently manned to ensure 
they can operate safely. Crewing is equated with the safety outcome. An interpretation of this 
provision analogous to the earlier discussion on a similar requirement in Article 94 (3) UNCLOS 
is that as long as safety outcomes at least comparable to, if not exceeding, manned vessels, can 
be achieved by MASS vessels, the intended outcome of the rule is achieved. The presence of a 
shore-based team in remote control or standby (or an on-board crew on standby) and temporary 
crews on unmanned autonomous ships provides the overseeing human element implicit in this 
rule. Naturally, to remove any doubt, it would be preferable for this manning rule to be amended 
to reflect the needs of MASS. 
 
 The application of SOLAS principles and standards relating to bridge design and location 
of equipment are premised on personnel manning the bridge.84 The ergonomics should be such 
as to facilitate the “tasks to be performed by the bridge team and the pilot in making full 
appraisal of the situation and in navigating the ship safely under all operational conditions” and 
“safe and effective bridge resource management.”85 As observed earlier, MASS will be guided 
by a different bridge concept, possibly much smaller for fully autonomous vessels in the event a 
crew is needed on board, and with a shore-based equivalent. This is important from another 
perspective. In gathering information on navigational conditions, the ship is also in a position, 
and indeed has a duty, to relay information on any dangerous conditions encountered. Thus the 
master has a duty to communicate to ships in the vicinity and competent authorities any danger 
messages concerning the presence of dangerous ice, dangerous derelict, other direct danger to 
                                                          
82 Ch. I SOLAS Convention. 
83 Ch. V, Reg. 14 SOLAS Convention. 
84 Ch. V, Reg. 15 SOLAS Convention. 
85 Ibid. 
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navigation, tropical storm, encounters with sub-freezing air temperatures associated with gales, 
and winds of force 10 or above on the Beaufort scale not forecasted.86 At this time it is unclear 
how MASS would comply with the danger message rule. 
 
It is likely that the new international standards would need to be developed and regulated 
for the new instrumentation and processes that will replace these human tasks. At this time 
SOLAS does not have rules addressing the shore-based control room. In remotely controlled and 
autonomous vessels, the bridge and watch tasks performed by humans will be replaced by a suite 
of sensors and daytime and infrared cameras in addition to the usual instrumentation, such as 
radar and AIS, to enable processing of complex data streams and enable full appraisal of the 
ship’s location and situation. Rules concerning the maintenance of a watch during the operation 
of the vessel are currently premised on crew presence. While at sea a ship is required to maintain 
a continuous watch, including a radio watch for broadcasts of maritime safety information.87 For 
watch purposes, SOLAS requires that every ship shall carry personnel qualified for distress and 
safety radiocommunication.88 The pertinent rules would need to be adapted to enable 
performance of watch functions by the off-board team responsible for the ship or to permit 
automated task performance. 
 
With no crew, the vessel might not need the usual number of survival craft. The rules 
concerning the manning of survival craft would have contingent (in the event the vessel is 
boarded), if any application. The general rule for all ships is that they have a sufficient number of 
trained persons on board for mustering and assisting untrained persons, and a sufficient number 
of crew members must be available for launching an on-board survival craft.89 MASS could 
justify an exemption from or modification of these rules. 
 
The International Convention on Load Lines of 1966 (LLC),90 another vital maritime 
safety instrument, in addition to setting out rules for the safe loading of ships, further provides 
                                                          
86 Ch. V, Reg. 31 SOLAS Convention. 
87 Ch. IV, Reg. 12 SOLAS Convention. 
88 Ch. IV, Reg. 16 SOLAS Convention. 
89 Ch. III, Reg. 10 SOLAS Convention. 
90 International Convention on Load Lines, 5 April 1966, UNTS 640, 133 (LLC); Protocol of 1988 relating to the 
International Convention on Load Lines, 11 November 1988, IMO Doc. HSSC/CONF/12. 
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for construction standards to ensure safe work and passage spaces on board. The LLC has 
provisions for the protection of the crew, such as standards for deckhouses for accommodation, 
guard rails, safe passageways, and stowage of cargo in a manner to permit safe crew passage,91 
which might not be required in the design and construction of MASS to the same extent. It is 
likely that an exemption for MASS will be also be required in this instrument. 
 
B. Crew Training, Certification, and Work Conditions 
 
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers of 1978 (STCW Convention) is the principal international maritime instrument 
dedicated to the training and certification of seafarers. The Convention establishes that “each 
Administration shall require every company to ensure that its ships are manned in compliance 
with the applicable safe manning requirements of the Administration”.92 Shipping companies93 
are responsible for the manning of their ships in compliance with the Convention and that 
properly certificated seafarers are assigned for service on their ships.94 The ship’s complement 
must be able to “effectively co-ordinate their activities in an emergency situation and in 
performing functions vital to safety or to the prevention or mitigation of pollution.”95 Levels of 
safe manning are further addressed by the Principles of Minimum Safe Manning.96 
 
In theory, where MASS are fully autonomous, they will render redundant the application 
of much of the STCW Convention, as well as the important Maritime Labour Convention of 
2006 (MLC) which promotes the rights of seafarers and establishes a framework for conditions 
                                                          
91 Annex I, Ch. II, Regs. 25 and 25-1 LLC. 
92 Ch. I, Reg. I/14 (1) STCW Convention. 
93 ‘Company’ is defined as “the owner of the ship or any other organization or person such as the manager, or the 
bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation of the ship from the shipowner and who, on 
assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all the duties and responsibilities imposed on the company by 
these regulations.”, Ch. I, Reg. I/1 (23) STCW Convention. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 IMO Assembly, Principles of Minimum Safe Manning, Resolution A.1047(27) of 30 November 2011, IMO Doc. 
A 27/Res.1047 (20 December 2011). The Principles consist of: Annex 1 – Guidelines for the Application of 
Principles of Safe Manning; Annex 2 – Guidelines for Determination of Minimum Safe Manning; Annex 3 – 
Responsibilities in the Application of Principles of Minimum Safe Manning; Annex 4 – Guidance on Contents and 
Model Form of Minimum Safe Manning Document; and Annex 5 – Framework for Determining Minimum Safe 
Manning. 
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of employment and occupational health and safety on ships.97 Where MASS have crews 
deployed temporarily, the STCW Convention and MLC will apply. The MLC protections are 
likely not extendable to the team operating MASS from shore as the definition of seafarer 
presumes work at sea.98 In practice, there are a number of vital functions performed on board the 
ship, both in normal and emergency situations pursuant to SOLAS and articulated in terms of 
personnel requirements, that would need to be addressed by MASS and the teams responsible for 
their operation or for overseeing the systems that run the vessels. The potential impact of 
automation is already recognised in the framework for determining minimum safe manning, in 
particular that functions on board a ship “may increase or decrease manning levels depending on 
availability and appropriate procedures and of specific capability enabling 
technology/automation.”99 
 
The usual personnel training requirements reflect the various functions on board the ship. 
For deck operations, the rules include mandatory minimum requirements for officers in charge of 
the navigational watch on ships of 500 gross tonnage (GRT) or more100 as well as for 
certification of masters and chief mates for ships of both more and less than 500 GRT,101 and 
certification of ratings.102 There are similar requirements for the engine room department. The 
rules include certification on the engineering watch both in manned and, when on duty, in 
unmanned engine rooms,103 and mandatory minimum requirements for certification of ratings on 
the watch in manned engine-rooms and, when periodically on duty, in unmanned engine-
rooms.104 The recent updating of standards to reflect the reality that ships may have unmanned 
engine rooms for prolonged periods is evidence that certain ship functions are already capable of 
full automation. Requirements for radiocommunications and radio personnel include mandatory 
minimum requirements for certification for Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
(GMDSS).105 There are also mandatory minimum special personnel training requirements for 
                                                          
97 Maritime Labour Convention, 23 February 2006, ILM 45, 792 (MLC). 
98 According to Art. 2 (1)(f) MLC ‘seafarer’ means “any person who is employed or engaged or works in any 
capacity on board a ship to which this Convention applies”. 
99 Principles of Minimum Safe Manning (note 97), Annex 5 at 1.5. 
100 Ch. II, Reg. II/1 STCW Convention. 
101 Ch. II, Reg. II/2-3 STCW Convention. 
102 Ch. II, Reg. II/4 STCW Convention. 
103 Ch. III, Reg. III/1 STCW Convention. 
104 Ch. III, Reg. III/4 STCW Convention. 
105 Ch. IV, Reg. IV/2 STCW Convention. 
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certain classes of ships, such as tankers, ro-ro ships, and passenger vessels.106 A vital rule in the 
Convention is that “a safe continuous watch or watches appropriate to the prevailing 
circumstances and conditions are maintained in all seagoing ships at all times”107 under the 
direction of the master. The interpretation of ‘watch’ functions with respect to SOLAS are 
relevant here as well. 
 
 The STCW Convention effectively defines the standards of competence expected of all 
human-performed functions on-board at all times. The Convention ensures human competence in 
decision-making. While MASS will largely shed off the human component and integrate the 
various functions into a single system, they are still expected to produce comparable safety, 
environmental, and security outcomes as manned ships. During the voyage, the system, whether 
overseen remotely from off-board and/or in an automated manner, provides centralised overview 
and management of all ship operations. While in port, MASS would be serviced and maintained 
as other ships. With respect to shore-based personnel monitoring and/or in control of MASS, 
‘competence’ will continue to be a requirement, although the precise content will need to be 
redefined and adapted. The shore-based personnel will be highly qualified personnel in 
navigational, engineering, and informatics aspects of the vessel. Standards for their training and 
certification will likely need to be enhanced. In the case of fully automated vessels, autonomous 
decision-making introduces a novel approach to ‘competence’ and it is likely that new technical 
standards will need to be developed. 
 
Also, and as observed earlier, the STCW rules on manning requirements do not apply to 
warships. The exception applies to “warships, naval auxiliaries and other ships owned or 
operated by a State and engaged only on governmental non-commercial service.”108 This 
exception is accompanied by an important proviso to the effect that “each Party shall ensure by 
the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing the operations or operational capabilities of 
such ships owned or operated by it, that the persons serving on board such ships meet the 
requirements of the Convention so far as is reasonable and practicable.”109 
                                                          
106 Ch. V STCW Convention. 
107 Ch. VIII, Reg. VIII/1 STCW Convention. 
108 Art. III (a) STCW Convention. 
109 Ibid. 




C. The ‘Rules of the Road’ 
 
The ‘rules of the road’ for the safe navigation of ships are set out in the Convention on the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea of 1972 (COLREGS) and apply to the 
high seas and all navigable waters.110 The COLREGS include core rules for safe navigation (Part 
A – general; Part B – steering and sailing rules) in conditions of normal and reduced visibility 
and signalling to other ships in the vicinity (Part C – lights and shapes; Part D – sound and light 
signals). The rules nourish the standard of good seamanship expected of the ordinary mariner 
and against which the standard of care in the navigation of a vessel is assessed. Thus the rules 
provide no basis for exemptions from compliance with the rules or from exercising the 
precaution necessary and expected in the ordinary practice of seamen.111 
 
 Although unmanned, MASS are required to observe the COLREGS and the underlying 
standard of good seamanship. The rules are explicit in their reference to vessels and therefore do 
not provide any immediate problem of textual interpretation. The definition of vessel as “every 
description of water craft” used or capable of being used as means of transportation over water 
easily covers MASS.112 MASS will not be expected to enjoy special privileges. They do not 
qualify as vessels ‘not under command’, which enjoy the privilege of a stand-on vessel, because 
this technical term refers only to “a vessel which through some exceptional circumstance is 
unable to manoeuvre as required by these Rules and is therefore unable to keep out of the way of 
another vessel.”113 Rather, the issues that could arise likely stem from how they would be applied 
when an autonomous vessel is in the vicinity of other vessels and the potential legal 
consequences. 
 
 In general, the Part B rules apply to MASS without significant issues of interpretation. 
The steering rules require that every vessel must maintain a proper look-out in any condition of 
visibility. This is described as “by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate 
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in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and 
of the risk of collision.”114 As described earlier, MASS will be equipped with a sophisticated 
system of technologies for full situational awareness, including geopositioning, radar, sensors, 
and continuous streaming cameras, all generating data for an algorithm to translate into 
information and advice for human or automated decision-making. In theory, automation will be 
able to more accurately navigate the vessel and avoid the human element contribution to 
maritime collisions and allisions. There is a lesson to be learned from over-reliance on 
technology for safe navigation. Following the introduction of radar on board ships, there were 
numerous radar-assisted collisions that were ultimately attributed to poor look-out. Seafarers at 
the time misused radar or over-relied on its use, thus refraining from using all means available to 
determine the position of other vessels and communicate with them if necessary to avoid close 
quarters.115 There could also be complex legal consequences in determining contributory 
negligence and consequential liabilities, in particular where the vessel is fully automated. In 
collision cases, unlike allisions, it is often the case that the collision is the result of negligence on 
the part of both ships involved. 
 
 Another rule whose operationalisation will need careful consideration concerns the risk 
of collision and the action to be taken to avoid close quarters. The vessel has the duty to “use all 
available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk 
of collision exists” and in case of doubt to deem that a risk of collision exists.116 The rule is 
supported by further rules concerning the proper use of radar (learning from radar-assisted 
collisions) and avoiding of assumptions on scanty information. This rule relies heavily on data 
inputs on traffic within the vicinity of the vessel, general conditions of navigation (e.g. weather, 
visibility, ice presence, etc.), proper use of equipment, and intelligent judgement. It is argued that 
MASS will be better able to collect data and make intelligent decisions.117 In less than optimal 
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conditions when information is scanty, the extent to which human experience and judgement 
call, accompanied by good seamanship, can be replaced by an algorithm remains to be seen. 
 
The Part C rules on lights and shapes, respectively for night time and day time sailing, 
will apply. These rules are important to enable vessels in each other’s vicinity to recognise their 
respective status and privilege and apply the respective rule for stand-on and give-way vessels 
while ensuring safe distances. While not granting them any special privilege, the introduction of 
dedicated new lights and shapes for MASS ships to indicate their presence to other vessels in 
their vicinity could be sensible and precautionary additions to the rules. The Part D rules on 
sounds and signals also apply, although the actual operation of manoeuvring and warning whistle 
blasts and light signals would be done remotely or automatically. 
 
D. Environment Protection 
 
The absence of crews on MASS can be expected to produce impacts on environmental regulation 
with respect to on-board procedures, waste management, and reporting requirements. Again, 
examples are provided to highlight the point. MARPOL Annex I on-board requirements for the 
master or crew’s familiarity with essential shipboard procedures relating to the prevention of 
pollution by oil in the case of unmanned ships would need to be reviewed to enable a port State 
inspector to ascertain compliance with requirements in some other manner.118 The absence of a 
crew might significantly reduce the relevance of Annexes IV and V respectively concerning 
sewage and garbage. There would be a strong argument to consider the granting of exemptions 
from certain certification requirements with respect to these wastes. An analogous issue was 
recently considered by the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MPEC) with 
respect to proposed amendments to introduce certain exemptions from MARPOL Annexes I, IV, 
and VI survey and certification requirements for unmanned non-self-propelled barges.119 The 
reasoning was that these unmanned barges do not have structures or equipment that generate 
pollutants addressed by MARPOL, such as sewage, and that the added administrative 
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requirements, such as issuing and carrying the required International Sewage Pollution 
Prevention Certificate, were unnecessary. Among other, this was relevant for the implementation 
of the III Code in the conduct of the audits of Annexes for compliance with instruments covered 
by that code and port State inspection.120 The MEPC decided against an open-ended exemption, 
and favoured a capped exemption of no more than five years, despite views to the contrary.121 
 
In addition to MARPOL, other environmental conventions could be impacted with 
respect to functions to be performed by the crew. In particular, the International Convention for 
the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments of 2004 prescribes that some 
officers and crew be familiar with the Ballast Water Management Plan and their duties in ballast 
water management operations on their ship.122 In the case of MASS this knowledge expectation 




This article has identified several issues concerning potential impacts of MASS on the 
international law of the sea and international maritime law. The pertinent UNCLOS 
jurisdictional frameworks relevant for MASS were set out, while the IMO conventions that 
nourish that framework and the nitty-gritty international rules and standards were considered. 
Functioning together, the two systems ensure that international navigation rights enjoyed by all 
ships are protected and that the exercise of jurisdiction over international shipping is within that 
framework and in accordance with generally accepted international maritime rules and standards. 
The advent of MASS, although potentially accommodated, has been demonstrated to challenge 
the application of particular rules of the two systems. While there is room for interpreting 
affected rules in the conventions in a manner consistent with the general rules for the 
interpretation of treaties,123 there are also gaps that are not easily addressed through 
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interpretation alone. Moreover, in the interest of clarity, amendment of a rule might be preferable 
to waiting for an interpretation from an authoritative body. 
 
The respective abilities of the UNCLOS and IMO conventions to respond to the change 
in the operational environment of shipping and navigation promised by MASS are different. In 
the event the manning requirements in Article 94 UNCLOS cannot be waived through a 
functional interpretation, it could be difficult to amend the Convention. While the UNCLOS has 
amendment procedures, they have not been utilised to date and change to the Convention has 
been effected through separate implementation agreements adopted after laborious diplomatic 
processes.124 However, the UNCLOS has a simplified procedure, as yet untested, that could 
potentially be used to address technical changes to Article 94. A State party would need to 
propose an amendment for adoption through the simplified procedure, communicated to the UN 
Secretary-General who in turn communicates the proposal to all States parties, and in the event 
of no objection being lodged by a State party within a period of one year, the amendment would 
be adopted.125 Should interpretation or amendment of Article 94 UNCLOS not be possible, 
future State practice in registering MASS vessels and exercising effective jurisdiction and 
control over them to the same extent as manned ships could well provide a customary law basis 
for accommodating automated ships.126 
 
In comparison, IMO regulation is substantially more adaptable because several of the key 
instruments affected by MASS have tacit amendment procedures. The MEPC and MSC, as the 
two key committees tasked with the maintenance of the safety and environmental conventions 
for which the IMO is responsible, have the necessary authority and machinery to amend the 
technical aspects of safety and environmental conventions using the simplified tacit acceptance 
procedure following consideration by the pertinent committee, instead of a diplomatic 
conference convened by the Organization.127 However, a potential issue for the IMO is how to 
eliminate the manning requirement for fully autonomous ships in a manner that retains 
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consistency with a provision to the contrary in Article 94 UNCLOS,128 unless the text can be 
interpreted to accommodate MASS as discussed earlier. 
 
The IMO is well poised and advised to proactively address the regulatory needs of 
MASS. As other studies, this article has observed that while much of the IMO regulatory system 
will be able to accommodate this new class(es) of vessels, it is very likely that there are many 
rules and standards in several maritime conventions that will need to be adapted through 
interpretation or amendment. The IMO’s strategic directions provide for keeping “under review 
the technical and operational safety aspects of all types of ships”,129 which will include MASS. It 
oversees the maintenance of a regulatory system to promote harmonisation and facilitate 
compliance with its instruments. Hence, the multi-Member State proposal for a regulatory 
scoping exercise of the Organization’s instruments is timely130 and the initial approach defined 
by the MSC appropriate.131 The IMO will take a proactive approach that will explore a range of 
impacts of surface vessels employing different levels of automation, including on safety, 
security, ports, pilotage, and incident response, including legal responsibility and liability 
issues.132 
 
One can speculate on what precise regulatory changes will be necessary. Degrees of 
automation with respect to aspects of ship operation have been gradually introduced over time, 
but automation on a large scale as in the case of MASS has not yet been considered by the IMO. 
Given the multiple points of impact of MASS on maritime regulations discussed in this article, at 
a minimum the approach to adaptation should be systemic, rather than a piecemeal convention 
by convention, code by code approach. Hence, a comprehensive impact review of all of the IMO 
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instruments is highly desirable and some studies have already made the first efforts in this 
direction.133 
 
Changes to rules and standards concerning ship construction and equipping will be 
expected, in particular to take account of modifications to the usual designs for the bridge, 
equipment on board, crew accommodations and passageways, and life-saving craft. What is 
uncertain at this early stage is the extent of the change as we can reasonably expect different 
levels of automation on MASS, and across several classes of ships (e.g. bulkers, container ships). 
In this respect, the goal-based approach to maritime regulation will substantially facilitate the 
accommodation of various technologies to produce desired safety, security, and environmental 
outcomes.134 
 
Particular MASS vessels can be expected to justify exemptions from certain rules. Some 
conventions have provisions permitting exemptions issued by national maritime administrations, 
and other States parties are expected to be notified of exemptions135 or equivalents.136 This 
flexibility will be useful in transitioning MASS into a system designed for very different ships. 
For example, compliance with particular certification requirements will be superfluous on ships 
with the highest levels of automation (e.g. sewage certificates), and exemptions would be 
appropriate. In other instances, rule compliance for MASS might need adaptation of the 
regulatory requirement. A fully automated vessel will likely have an electronic log. Consistently 
with the current trend, documentation requirements will be satisfied electronically and reporting 
for various regulatory purposes will become increasingly passive. 
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Classification Societies will play a key role in helping to develop appropriate standards 
and unified requirements. IMO regulation frequently relies on the unified requirements adopted 
by the International Association of Classification Societies. However, regulatory 
accommodations will likely impact the mandatory audits under the III Code whose purpose is to 
promote compliance with international instruments with no more favourable treatment. The 
implications will extend to port State control inspections, which enforce international 
instruments also with no more favourable treatment to ship or flag. 
 
There will be implications for private law purposes which, while beyond the remit of this 
article, should be mentioned, such as the evolving meaning of seaworthiness in the carriage of 
goods by sea and insurance contracts, among others, since the ability of MASS vessels to depart 





The advent of MASS is a potential game-changer for international shipping and its regulation. 
As the human factor is withdrawn from shipping in favour of artificial intelligence and 
accompanying automated systems, international maritime law is not likely to function on a 
business-as-usual scenario and will need to be adapted and further developed. However, it is 
unlikely that the human factor will be fully removed from shipping as there will continue to be 
trades and regions that will rely on manned ships. What can be envisioned is a future that will 
have a versatile mix of manned and unmanned ships, often interacting when in close proximity 
while navigating, varying by trading region, and with some trading regions having a higher 
concentration of automated ship operations because of early regional buy-in. 
 
MASS will potentially produce a range of direct and indirect impacts on the law of the 
sea and maritime law, in particular during their early introduction when the two legal regimes 
will need to adapt to the new technological environment. MASS will challenge a regulatory 
system that has often lagged behind technology. The IMO has an opportunity to put an 
anticipatory regulatory framework in place to influence the directions of the MASS technologies. 




Finally, in scoping the regulatory impacts and future agenda, the IMO should also 
consider larger social questions. For example, as automated systems produce greater efficiencies 
and cost-savings, are the technological risks fully internalised? Is substitution of artificial 
intelligence for human judgement socially acceptable in all areas and aspects of shipping and 
navigation, for example also with respect to passenger vessels? Are safety valves against 
technological failure and hacking needed? How will MASS affect the distribution of risk in 
shipping and with what consequences for responsibility and liability? 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3130453 
